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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court's decision affirming the magistrate's dismissal of
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition"). The Petition alleged that the Idaho
Commission of Pardons and Parole ("Parole Commission") violated Appellant's constitutional
rights in the course ofrevoking his parole.

B. Procedural History
Appellant, Terrence J. Matthews ("Matthews"), filed his Petition on October 30, 2006.
(R., p. l .) On January 5, 2007, Respondents filed a Response and Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R., p. 137.) On February 14, 2007, counsel for Matthews entered an appearance in
this action. (R., Register of Actions, p. I.) Subsequently, the parties submitted additional
briefing regarding the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., pp. 155, 164.) The
magistrate heard oral argument on April 16, 2007, and issued his Order Dismissing Petition for
Habeas Corpus ("Magistrate's Order") on May 4, 2007. (R., p. 173.) Matthews filed a Notice of
Appeal on June l 1, 2007. (R., p. 198.)
The parties then filed their respective briefs (R., pp. 202,210, 221 ), and oral argument
was heard by the district court on January 7, 2008. (R., Register of Actions, p. 2.) On January
24, 2008, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the
Magistrate's dismissal of Matthews' Petition. (R., p. 225.) Matthews filed his Notice of Appeal
on March l 2, 2008. (R., p. 232.)

--···-- -~- ·- .L - -- --- -- ----- -

C. Statement of Facts

The Magistrate's Order accurately describes the relevant facts as follows:
On November 27, 1991, Petitioner was convicted oflewd conduct with a minor
and sexual abuse of a minor. Petitioner was sentenced concurrently to a minimum
of five (5) years and an additional ten (10) years indeterminate.
In October I 996, Petitioner was released on parole. In February 2002, the Parole
Commission revoked Petitioner's parole based upon Petitioner's violation of the
terms of parole.
On May 9, 2002, Petitioner was once again placed on parole. At the time of his
parole on May 9, 2002, Petitioner agreed in writing to follow certain conditions of
parole which included seven special conditions. On May 13, 2002, Petitioner
signed a Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision.
On November 15, 2002, the Petitioner's supervising parole officer issued a
special progress report and request for warning letter regarding Petitioner's
presence in a bar against the terms of his parole. On November 30, 2002, the
Parole Commission issued a warning letter. In response, Petitioner signed an
agreement which, in part, provided, "I agree to conform strictly to the conditions
of my Parole Agreement. I understand that should new information come to light
regarding the November 15, 2002 report or another parole violation occurs, the
information contained in the November 15, 2002 report can be used against me in
a future parole violation."
Petitioner was given verbal instructions to address non-compliant behavior on
June 25, 2002, July 8, 2002, July 11, 2002, July 12, 2002, July 18, 2002, and
August 6, 2002. On March 5, 2003, Petitioner was transferred to the Close
Custody Treatment Unit to "better monitor his manipulative behavior, alleged 2nd
incident of stalking, and other Parole Compliance issues." On March 12, 2003,
Petitioner signed a Close Community Supervision Agreement of Supervision. On
July 26, 2005, Petitioner signed a Behavioral Contract. On July 28, 2005,
Petitioner also signed another Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision and
Supplemental Parole Conditions.
Matters came to a head in July 2005. A search of Petitioner's residence found a
child's shoes and Fisher Price toy in his bedroom as well as a small doll in his
vehicle. In July 2005, Petitioner disclosed that his son lived with him for a month
without Petitioner seeking the necessary permission.

On July 28, 2005, a polygraph examination was conducted. The expert
administering the polygraph believed Petitioner to be deceptive as to his
unsupervised contacts with minors. Petitioner disclosed to the polygrapher that he
had several unsupervised contacts with minors including allowing a woman and
her young daughter to live with him for two weeks. Petitioner had not informed
his probation officers of these contacts despite requests of him for such
information.
On July 29, 2005, Petitioner was arrested on an Agent's Warrant for violating the
terms and conditions of his parole. Specifically, Petitioner was arrested for the
following parole violations: failure to submit regular written reports to his parole
officer; failure to follow instructions from parole officer; leaving his assigned
district without written permission; failure to abstain from drugs and alcohol,
failure to avoid businesses where alcohol is the main source of income; failure to
obtain a substance abuse evaluation; failure to comply with sex offender
treatment; and associating with minor children without approved supervision.
Petitioner's preliminary hearing regarding his alleged parole violations was
scheduled for August 3, 2005. The preliminary hearing was continued until
August 10, 2005, at Petitioner's request in order for him to seek legal
representation. The preliminary hearing was continued again until August 16,
2005 at the request of Petitioner's attorney.
On August 16, 2005, the preliminary hearing was conducted with Petitioner and
his attorney present. The officer conducting the preliminary hearing found
probable cause for the alleged violations of Petitioner's conditions of parole. A
copy of the Preliminary Hearing Report was provided to Petitioner on August 18,
2005.
Petitioner's parole violation hearing was scheduled for September 12, 2005 and
October 5, 2005 and continued both times at Petitioner's request. The hearing
was held on October 21, 2005. Petitioner was advised prior to the hearing of his
rights including the right to present witnesses and evidence, the right to subpoena
witnesses, and the right to be represented. Petitioner was represented by legal
counsel.
The Parole Commission Hearing Officer in an eighteen ( 18) page decision found
Petitioner to have committed all of the alleged violation, except for the alleged
failure to obtain a substance abuse evaluation. The Hearing Officer recommended
that Petitioner's parole be revoked. The Hearing Officer commented of
Petitioner, "He appears to put more time and effort into lying to people and

manipulating them than on developing attributes of honesty and respect for
others." The Hearing Officer issued her written decision on January 3, 2006.
The Parole Commission scheduled a revocation or disposition hearing for
February l, 2006. The hearing was continued to March 15, 2006 at Petitioner's
request to enable him to have his attorney present. The March 15, 2006 hearing
had to be continued because Petitioner became hysterical and could not get
himself under control. The revocation hearing was continued until April 13,
2006. Petitioner was again represented by an attorney at the hearing.
The Parole Commission adopted the findings of the Hearing Officer for the parole
violation hearing and revoked Petitioner's parole. The Parole Commission
observed in their April 13, 2006 decision, "It is obviously clear that he is not a
safe risk in the community due to his decisions not to follow any rules pertinent to
his crime. He will not work his treatment program.... Subject is being
considered for a Violent Sexual Predator designation." Although testimony was
taken, the Parole Commission expressly noted that "the reasons of the
Commission for revoking and denying parole are based solely on the findings of
the Hearing Officer, not on testimony from any witnesses at this Revocation
hearing."
(R., pp. 174-178) (citations omitted).
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Matthews raises nine (9) issues on appeal. Respondents restate those issues as follows:
l) Did the magistrate abuse his discretion by dismissing Matthews' Petition without
holding an evidentiary hearing?
2) Did the parole revocation proceedings violate Matthews' right to due process?
3) Did revocation of Matthews' parole violate his rights against double jeopardy or cruel
and unusual punishment?
4) Can Matthews present an ineffective assistance of counsel elairn in this appeal'/
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
When the district court acts in its appellate capacity:
The St1preme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those
findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom
and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the
district court's decision as a matter of procedure.

Nicholls v. Blaser, I 02 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho
670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008).
The decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus is a matter within the discretion of the
magistrate court. Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 127,376 P.2d 704 (1962); Brennan v. State,
122 ldaho 911,914,841 P.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1992). In reviewing the exercise of discretion in a
habeas corpus proceeding, the reviewing court conducts a three-tiered inquiry to determine
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the
boundaries of such discretion, and reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Brennan, 122
Idaho at 9 I4; Sivak v. Aa'a County, 115 Idaho 762, 763, 769 P.2d 1134 (Ct. App. 1989). If a
petitioner is not entitled to relief on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the decision of the
lower court to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing will be upheld. Brennan, 122
Idaho at 917.
Additionally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to habeas corpus
proceedings. Sivak v. Ada County, 118 Idaho 193, 795 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1990); Idaho Code §
19-4208. The standard for summary judgment is as folJows:

When the Supreme Court reviews a district court's decision on summary
judgment, it employs the same standard as that properly employed by the trial
court when originally ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is proper "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Finally, this
Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and
will draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in
favor of the party opposing the motion.
McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,152,937 P.2d 1222 (1997) (citations omitted).

IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion By Dismissing Matthews' Petition
Without Holding An Evidentiary Hearing.
The overarching theme presented by Matthews throughout this proceeding is that the
magistrate abused his discretion by not affording Matthews an evidentiary hearing. As explained
below, and supported by the record, the magistrate did not abuse his discretion.
1. The magistrate had proper jurisdiction over the Petition.
As a preliminary matter, Matthews appears to argue that the magistrate did not have
jurisdiction to dispose of the Petition. Appellant's Brief, pp. 31-32. This claim is without merit.
First, Matthews did not raise his jurisdictional issue below. Therefore, he is precluded from
raising the issue for the first time on appeal. See Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573,580, 21 P.3d 895
(2001) (court "will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.")
Even assuming that Matthews may challenge the magistrate's jurisdiction on appeal, his
argument fails as a matter of law. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(E), "when approved by the
administrative district judge of a judicial district" magistrates have jurisdiction over "[a]ll habeas

corpus proceedings regardless of the nature or origin." In turn, the rules for the Second Judicial
District provide that "[t]he Magistrate Judges of the 2

nd

Judicial District are given jurisdiction

over all matters designated in ... Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 82(c)(I) and !RCP 82(c)(2)."

Second District Rules for Court Management and Jurisdiction ofMagistrate Judges, Idaho State
Bar Desk Book (2008-2009), p. 172. Therefore, the magistrate was properly delegated
jurisdiction to resolve Matthews' Petition. Furthermore, Matthews waived any objection to the
magistrate by failing to file a written objection before the commencement of any hearing.
1.R.C.P. 82(c)(3).

2. The magistrate did not abuse his discretion by dismissing the Petition.
Matthews contends that the magistrate abused his discretion by dismissing Matthews'
Petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Appellant's Brief, p. 30. Specifically, Matthews
asserts that the Parole Commission's decision to revoke his parole and forfeit his parole time was
not supported by substantial evidence. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-16. Therefore, according to
Matthews, the magistrate should have convened an evidentiary hearing to address the alleged
factual shortcomings. As established below, the magistrate did not abuse his discretion by
dismissing the Petition.
The decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus is a matter within the discretion of the
magistrate court. Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 127; Brennan v. State, 122 Idaho 911,914. If
a petitioner is not entitled to relief on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the decision of the
lower comi to dismiss the petition without an evidentiaiy hearing will be upheld. Brennan, 122
Idaho at 917.

In Craig v. State, 123 Idaho 121,844 P.2d 1371 (Ct. App. 1992), the Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the Parole Commission's decision that a parole violation had occurred "will
not be overturned unless the reviewing court can say that the finding represents an abuse of
discretion." Craig, 123 Idaho 121, 126. "An abuse of discretion will occur only if the finding of
a violation is not supported by substantial reliable evidence or if the procedures followed deprive
the parolee of due process." Id.
The statute relevant to the present case is Idaho Code § 20-229B, which provides in
pertinent part that "[i]f the ... hearing officer ... should conclude that the allegations of violation
of the conditions of parole have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and constitute
sufficient cause for the revocation of parole, then a dispositional hearing shall be convened
during a regular session of the commission to execute an order of parole revocation." As
correctly observed by the court in Craig:
The statute has two components, one factual, the other discretionary. The
threshold issue before the Commission is a question of fact. A violation of the
conditions of parole must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The
second step involves the exercise of the Commission's discretion based on the
factual results of the first inquiry.
123 Idaho at 124 (emphasis added). The court then elaborated on the Commission's factual inquiry:

It is the state's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all facts
necessary to show the parolee violated a condition of his parole. "By a
preponderance of the evidence is meant such evidence as, when weighed with that
opposed to it, has more convincing force and from which it results the greater
probability of truth lies therein." Where the Commission finds upon any
substantial evidence in the record that a fact has been proven, the finding will not
be disturbed. Where there is conflicting evidence in the record, of a substantial
nature, on a given point of fact, the Commission shall be the sole arbiter of the
weight to be given to the evidence, that is, whether a fact has been proven by a

--~8.______ _

"preponderance of the evidence." Thus, where there is substantial although
disputed evidence in the record before the Commission to support a finding that
the alleged violation did occur, that finding will not be overturned by the
reviewing court.
Id. at 125 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

Nonetheless, Matthews misconstrues the role of the magistrate when reviewing the Parole
Commission's decision. That role is simply to determine whether the Parole Commission abused
its discretion in making its decision. Craig, 123 Idaho 121, 126. In making this determination, it
is critical to bear in mind that "the Commission shall be the sole arbiter of the weight to be given
to the evidence, that is, whether a fact has been proven by a 'preponderance of the evidence'."

Craig, 123 Idaho at 125. In other words, resolving disputed issues of fact was solely within the
domain of the Commission. However, Matthews continues to argue that the magistrate should
have resolved those disputed factual issues in his favor and denied summary judgment, and then
should have held an evidentiary hearing. However, Idaho's well-established caselaw precludes
such an outcome.
Unlike an ordinary summary judgment proceeding, the magistrate was sitting in a
reviewing capacity, rather than as a trial court. The magistrate's only role was to determine
whether the Parole Commission abused its discretion. On appeal, the district court recognized
that the magistrate properly understood his role, when the district court stated: "I reiterate with
emphasis Judge Robinson's conclusion that his sole role was to decide ifthere was substantial
evidence to support the hearing officer's findings. (R., pp. 228-229) (citing Craig v. State, 123
Idaho at 125; emphasis in original). As long as there was substantial (although disputed)

--~--··-·------

'"

evidence to suppmi the Parole Commission's decision, the magistrate was bound to affirm that
decision. Instead of accepting this outcome, Matthews argues that those same factual disputes
that allegedly existed before the Parole Commission should have precluded summary judgment.
However, those factual disputes have already been resolved and it is was not the magistrate's
position to substitute his own judgment for that of the Parole Commission. The record in this
case clearly shows that the magistrate properly understood his role on review and properly
exercised his discretion in dismissing Matthews' Petition.
First, the Magistrate properly stated the applicable standard ofreview. (R., pp. 179-180.)
At the April 16, 2007 Summary Judgment Hearing, the Magistrate clearly demonstrated that he
understood and was applying the appropriate standard. Specifically, the Court stated:
Mr. Matthews was given full opportunity at his factual hearing to show why he
failed to comply with these conditions. He offered his reason, and it was rejected.
And for me to then conduct a full hearing again it just does seem to me, Mr. Van
ldour, that you're asking me to weigh the evidence once again and give Mr.
Matthews a de novo hearing and I don't see any authority for me to conduct a de
novo hearing.
That's where again the review is not a de novo review. That is, it's very limited.
That when it comes to a parole commissions hearing decision, whether there
exists substantial evidence and that means evidence that a reasonable person
could rely upon, and it seems to me that if you have written conditions that Mr.
Matthews violates, that's a reasonable basis to find a violation of his parole. And
a factual hearing would merely cause me to re-hear the very same evidence that
the Parole Commission has already reviewed and found in its wisdom to
constitute a basis for the parole revocation.
That when I look at each of the allegations or the violations there is a basis for
that, and that's what I have to find, whether or not there was a basis for the
decision. Not whether it's a decision I would have issued or would have agreed
to, but rather instead on whether there's a basis for it.

(Tr., p. 29, L. 21-p. 31, L. 13.)

Next, the magistrate conducted a detailed review of each alleged parole violation and
determined that substantial evidence supported the Parole Commission's decision that Matthews
violated multiple conditions of his parole. (R., pp. 181-187.) Likewise, in reviewing the
magistrate's decision, the district court stated that "Judge Robinson meticulously reviewed each
violation and concluded there was substantial evidence to support each of them." (R., p. 227.)
The district court then accurately summarized the magistrate's role in reviewing the Parole
Commission's decision as follows: "The issue is not whether the magistrate would have made
the same findings based on evidence adduced at the hearing. Rather, the issue is whether or not
the evidence that was adduced was sufficient to warrant the hearing officer's findings." (R., p.
228.) The record is clear that the magistrate applied the appropriate standard ofreview in

reaching his decision, and there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Parole
Commission's decision. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in granting summary
judgment to Respondents.
B. The Parole Revocation Proceedings Did Not Violate Matthews' Right To Due Process.

Matthews argues that his right to due process in the course of the parole revocation
proceedings was violated. Specifically, Matthews contends that his right to due process was
violated I) because he did not receive the hearing officer's report within twenty (20) days
following his hearing; 2) because he was not allowed to cross examine witnesses at the
revocation hearing; and 3) because the Parole Commission did not audio-record its hearings. As

properly determined by the magistrate and district court, Matthews' due process rights were not
violated during the parole revocation process.

1. The delay in receiving the hearing officer's report did not violate Matthews'
right to due process.

Matthews' parole violation hearing was held on October 21, 2005. (R., p. 93.) The
hearing officer's written report was issued on January 3, 2006. (Id.) Matthews alleges that he
did not receive the hearing officer's report until January 25, 2006. (Id., p. 5.) According to
Matthews, because he did not receive the hearing officer's report within twenty (20) days as
required by Idaho Code § 20-229B, his right to due process was violated.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the United States Supreme Court
determined that a parolee was entitled to limited due process in the course of parole revocation.
However, the Court cautioned "that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution
and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole
revocations." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. The Court then explained that parole revocation
proceedings should consist of two stages: l) a "preliminary hearing" to determine whether there
is probable cause that a parole violation occun-ed; and 2) a "revocation hearing" to determine
whether parole should be revoked. Id. at 485.
Consistent with Morrissey, an alleged parole violator is entitled to a "preliminary
hearing" before a hearing officer selected by the executive director of the Parole Commission.
Idaho Code § 20-229. The hearing officer is supposed to issue her decision within twenty (20)
days after the hearing is concluded. Idaho Code§ 20-229B. Matthews alleges that he did not

receive the hearing officer's report within the statutory time frame and therefore he was denied
due process.
In dismissing this portion of Matthews' due process claim, the magistrate relied on Loomis

v. Killeen, 135 Idaho 607, 21 P.3d 929 (Ct. App. 2001), in concluding that Matthews "fail[ed] to
argue how the additional delay caused any harm or reached constitutional dimensions." (R., p.
190.) In that case, Loomis was aiTested on a parole violation but did not receive his preliminary
hearing until thirty-eight (38) days after bis arrest. On appeal, the court determined that this delay
violated Loomis' due process rights as outlined in Morrissey. Loomis, 135 ldaho at 610. However,
the court explained that "[w]hen a parolee has not been afforded a timely preliminary hearing, the
appropriate remedy generally is a release of the parolee from incarceration until such a hearing is
conducted." Id. at 612. Therefore, the court concluded:
By the time the magistrate acted on the petition, Loomis had received the requisite
preliminary hearing at which probable cause for bis incarceration was found, as well
as subsequent hearings where the parole violation was found to have occurred and
parole revocation was ordered. Thus, Loomis was no longer entitled to release from
custody.

Id. at 613 (footnote omitted).
The Magistrate's Order clearly demonstrates that the magistrate properly applied Loomis to
the facts of this case. (R., pp. l 90-192.) In this case, there was no prejudice to Matthews. As
detailed by the magistrate, Matthews (who was represented by counsel) requested and received
multiple continuances throughout the revocation proceedings. (R., p. 191.) Therefore, to the extent
there was any delay in the process, it was self-imposed. Furthermore, Matthews received the
hearing officer's repmi well before the date of the revocation hearing.

2. Matthews did not have a due process right to cross-examine witnesses at the
final revocation hearing.
Matthews contends that his due process rights were violated because he was not allowed
to cross-examine any witnesses at the final revocation hearing. As explained below, the
magistrate properly concluded that Matthews received the due process to which he was entitled.

In Morrissey, the Court explained that parole revocation proceedings should consist of
two stages: 1) a "preliminary hearing" to detem1ine whether there is probable cause that a parole
violation occurred; and 2) a "revocation hearing" to detem1ine whether parole should be revoked.

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485. With respect to the preliminary hearing, the Court stated that the
parolee "may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or
individuals who can give relevant information to the hearing officer. On request of the parolee,
[a] person who has given adverse information on which parole revocation is to be based is to be
made available for questioning in his presence." Id. at 487. Although the Court recognized a
limited right to cross-examine witnesses, that right exists only during the preliminary or factfinding stage of the proceedings. It does not exist at the revocation or disposition hearing. See

id. at 488. In making this determination, the Court "emphasize[ d] there is no thought to equate
this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense." id. at 489.
Furthermore, the Court stated that it was each state's responsibility to develop its own
specific procedures for parole revocation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488. There is nothing in
Idaho's parole statutes or the Parole Commission's rules that require the Commission to allow

cross-examination at the final revocation hearing. But see IDAPA 50.01.0l.400.03(c) (allowing
cross-examination at the fact-finding hearing). As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
Under the Commission's procedures, a parole revocation proceeding consists of
two parts; a fact-finding (parole violation) hearing, where the Commission
determines the parolee's guilt or innocence of the alleged parole violations, and a
revocation hearing, where the Commission reviews the alleged charges, the
testimony presented, and the findings on each alleged violation. IDAP A
50.0l.0l.650.08(a),(b); Chapman, 11 I Idaho.at 151, 721 P.2d at 1250. It is
during the revocation hearing that the Commission determines whether parole will
be revoked. IDAPA 50.0l.Ol.650.08(b). During the parole violation hearing, the
alleged parole violator has the right to (1) written notice of the violations as
charged, at least 24 hours prior to the hearing, (2) disclosure of the evidence
against him, (3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence, (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, unless good cause is found for not allowing such confrontation, (5) a
neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) a summary of all testimony and a
written statement of the findings on each alleged violation, stating the evidence
relied upon. IDAPA 50.0l.01.650.08(a)(i-vi).
Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 772, 918 P.2d 1213 (1996) (emphasis added).

As concluded by the court, "[t]he procedures and requirements promulgated by the Commission
for parole revocation proceedings, follow the procedures and requirements set forth in
Morrissey." Id. 1

The magistrate properly recognized that Matthews' limited right to cross examination did
not extend to the final revocation hearing. (R., pp. 188-190.) Specifically, the magistrate
pointed out that "[t]he parole revocation hearing is a disposition hearing that is held after the due
process hearing is concluded." (R., pp. 188-189.) Furthermore, Matthews "was afforded the full

1

Respondents recognize that Smith was based on a review of a fonner version of the Parole
Commission's administrative rules. However, the current version of the Parole Commission's
rules compels the same conclusion. See IDAPA 50.01.01.400.

panoply of due process at this evidentiary hearing including the right of cross-examination and
representation by an attorney." (R., p. 189.)
Specifically, Matthews was represented by counsel at the revocation hearing. (R., p.
129.) Petitioner's attorney had the opportunity to address the Parole Commission, and in fact did
so. (Id.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Parole Commission adopted the findings of the
hearing officer and elected to revoke Petitioner's parole. (R., pp. 130-135.) In reaching its
decision, the Parole Commission expressly stated that its decision to revoke parole was "based
solely on the findings of the Hearing Officer, not on testimony from any witnesses at this
Revocation Hearing." (R., p. 136.)
Additionally, Matthews' attorney actually cross-examined the parole officer and at least one
witness at the fact-finding hearing. (See R., pp. 96, 98-99, I 04.) Therefore, contrary to Matthews'
claim, he was able to cross-examine the same people who were present at the revocation hearing.
Also, Matthews' mother and brother were present at the fact-finding hearing. (R., p. 93.) In sum,
the same witnesses were present at both the fact-finding and revocation hearings. Matthews was
represented by counsel at both hearings. Counsel was allowed to cross-examine witnesses at the
fact-finding hearing. Likewise, witnesses allegedly favorable to Matthews were present at the factfinding hearing and able to present testimony on his behalf Simply stated, Matthews was afforded
the due process to which he was entitled.

3, The Parole Commission is not required to record its hearings.
The last aspect of Matthews' due process claim is his contention that his rights were
violated because the Parole Commission did not audio record the revocation proceedings.

Appellant's Brief; p. 27. As explained below, this claim lacks merit.
Before Matthews may assert an issue on appeal, he must obtain an adverse ruling on that
issue from the trial court. State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942 (1993) ("We will
not review a trial cowt's alleged e1Tor on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling
which forms the basis for the assignment of error."); State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27
( 1988) (Idaho Supreme Court would not review claim where appellant had not obtained ruling
from trial comi); State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 276-77, 678 P.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1984) (failure to
obtain a ruling on an issue below prevents appellate review absent showing of fundamental
error). Because Matthews failed to obtain an adverse ruling from the magistrate regarding the
lack of audio taped revocation hearings, he is precluded from raising the issue on appea!.2
Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that Matthews raised the issue on appeal to the
district comi.
Even assuming that Matthews properly preserved the issue for appeal, it is nonetheless
without merit. There is nothing in Morrissey, Idaho statutes regarding parole revocation, or the

2

Although Matthews' counsel mentioned the lack of recorded hearings during the April 16,
2007 hearing before the magistrate, Matthews never obtained an adverse ruling on the issue.
(See Tr., p. 21, L. 25-p. 22, L. 12.)

Parole Commission's rules that require the Parole Commission to record its hearings. Therefore,
the absence of a recorded hearing did not violate Matthews' due process rights.
C. The Revocation Of Matthews' Parole Did Not Violate His Rights Against Double
Jeopardy or Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
Matthews alleges that his rights against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual
punishment were violated when the Parole Commission relied on his past conduct as a basis for
revoking parole; and that by forfeiting his parole time, the Parole Commission unlawfully
extended his sentence.
Matthews essentially argues that because he had already been sanctioned for past conduct
while on parole, the Parole Commission was forbidden from taking that past behavior into
account when deciding to revoke his parole. See Appellant's Brief, p. 17. In rejecting this claim,
the magistrate explained: "Accepting Petitioner's argument, the State would be limited to
considering limited discrete acts separate from other past acts. Violations of parole would have
to be ignored once subject to sanction. Nothing in due process or the Eighth Amendment
requires such hamstringing of the Parole Commission." (R., p. 193.) Throughout this action,
Matthews has failed to provide any authority in support of this claim. Instead, he relies upon his
own conclusory statements.
As summarized by Matthews' parole officer, his parole violation was based on "[t]he whole
of these violations, exhibited over an extended period of time, demonstrate a lack of regard for rules
and the privilege of parole that has been granted him by the Commission." (R., p. 65.) Based on
these circumstances, it was appropriate for the parole officer to initiate revocation proceedings. The

absence of a new and particular violation does not invalidate that decision. There is nothing in the
parole statutes or Parole Commission administrative rules that prohibits evaluating a parolee's
history on parole when considering whether or not to revoke parole. In fact, a parolee may be
arrested "[wlhenever the commission finds that a parolee may have violated the conditions of
parole." Idaho Code§ 20-228 (emphasis added). Additionally, Matthews was put on notice that
past violations could be used against him in future violation proceedings. (See R., p. 49.) Because
there is no time limit for initiating a report of violation, nor is there any requirement of a "new"
violation, Matthews' claim is without merit.
Matthews also claims that the forfeiture of his parole time had the effect of lengthening
his sentence in violation of his rights against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment.

Appellant's Brief, p. 23. In rejecting this claim, the magistrate, relying on Gibson v. Bennett, 141
Idaho 270, l 08 P.3d 417 (Ct. App. 2005), properly held:
Upon release from prison, Petitioner will have served approximately twenty-two
(22) years in !DOC custody. Compared to the potential punishment of life
imprisonment, this length of time is not so "out of proportion to the gravity of the
offense committed and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable people."
Gibson, 141 Idaho at 275 (citation omitted). Therefore, Petitioner's argument is
rejected.
With respect to Petitioner's claim that the double jeopardy clause was violated,
"the violation of the terms of parole is not a separate punishment for Gibson's
underlying criminal offenses." Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho at 276. Therefore,
the double jeopardy clause is not violated.
(R., p. I 94.) Matthews fails to establish that the magistrate committed an error in this ruling.
Likewise, Matthews fails to meaningfully distinguish his claims from the ones rejected by the

court in Gibson. Accordingly, the magistrate properly dismissed Matthews' double jeopardy and
cruel and unusual claims.
D. Matthews Can Not Present An Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim In This Appeal.
Matthews attempts to raise a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
this appeal. Appellant's Brief, p. 29. As explained below, this claim is inappropriate and
without merit.
A habeas corpus action is a civil proceeding. Idaho Code § 19-4208. The Idaho Supreme
Court has held there is no right to appointment of counsel in habeas corpus cases. Quinlan v.
Idaho Comm 'nfor Pardons and Paroles, 138 ldaho 726, 69 P.3d 146 (2003). Because there is
no right to counsel in a habeas corpus case, Matthews can not assert an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
Even if Matthews had a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it would be
inappropriate for him to raise the issue in this appeal.
The question of competency of counsel is an extremely complex factual
determination which, in all but the most unusual cases, requires an evidentiary
hearing for determination. The resolution of those factual issues for the first time
upon appeal, based upon the trial record in which competency of counsel was not
at issue, is at best conjectural.
Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791, 702 P.2d 826 (1985) (quoting State v. Kraft, 96 Idaho 901,
906, 539 P.2d 254 (1975) (concurring opinion of Bakes, J.)). Where ineffective assistance of
counsel is raised as an issue in a direct appeal, absent established facts to the contrary, "it must
be presumed that defense counsel's actions were not due to inadequate preparation or ignorance,
and that defendant's representation by counsel was competently carried out." State v. Carter,
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103 Idaho 917,923,655 P.2d 434 (1982). Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court and court of
appeals have repeatedly warned it is generally inappropriate to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Parrot v. State, 117 Idaho 272, 274, 787 P.2d 258 (1990);

Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 792; Krqfi v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 672-73, 603 P.2d 1005
(1979); State v. Gomez, 127 Idaho 327,329,900 P.2d 803 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Marks, 119
Idaho 64, 66,803 P.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Steele, 118 Idaho 793,795,800 P.2d 680;

State v. Munoz, 118 Idaho 742,745,800 P.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho
516,523, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1985). The present case is no different. Therefore, Matthews'
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is inappropriate.

V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that this Court affirm
the district court's decision affirming the magistrate's dismissal of Matthews' Petition .
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